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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE
STATE OF UTAH

THE STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff-Respondent,

BRIEF OF APPELLANT

v.
LESTER RALPH ROMERO,

Case No. 16638

Defendant-Appellant.
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE
Appellant was charged with the criminal offense of Theft
by Receiving, a second degree felony.

DISPOSITION IN THE COURT BELOW
Appellant was convicted at a bench trial on April 2, 1979.

A Motion in Arrest of Judgment was heard and later denied on
May 17, 1979.

On August 20, 1979, the appellant was sentenced

to one to fifteen years in prison which was stayed pending a
ninety day evaluation at the prison and further stayed pending
this appeal.

The appellant was admitted to bail.

RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Appellant seeks a reversal of the conviction with an order
to dismiss the information.
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STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
On August 25, 1979, Investigator Charles Collins of the
Salt Lake County Attorney's office arrrested the appellant, Lester
Romero, under authority of an arrest warrant issued in another
matter. Investigator Collins, who had been investigating the
appellant on a wide range of matters full time for six weeks
prior to this arrest, (R-133) went to appellant's home at 8:30
a.m., with a sheriff's sergeant and, pursuant to plan, waited
for the appellant to get in a vehicle and drive out on a public
roadway whereupon he was stopped.

(R-132)

After appellant was taken into custody, he was asked for
permission to search the truck he was driving and he refused.
(R-110-111)

After conferring by radio with a deputy county attor-

ney who advised him to "seize the vehicle for evidence," (Def.
Ex. 3, Attached Appendix A), Investigator Collins impounded the
truck which was registered to "Golden Circle Investments by Lester
Romero."

(R-111)

Investigator Collins then went through the

truck seizing numerous i terns, mostly documents, including a stamped, sealed envelope addressed to "ABC" in Woods Cross, Utah,
(States Exhibit 10) which became the critical link to all evidence
used against the defendant in this case.
While the State contended at the Motion to Suppress that
this was a "routine impound inventory," (Memorandum in Opposition
R-23, et.

~·)

no written impound inventory was made.

In re-

sponse to a court order to produce the inventory, Investigator
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Collins furnished a "Supplementary Report" to the Salt Lake County
Attorney's Office, (Exhibit D-C, attached hereto as Appendix
A) which describes the arrest, search and seizure and lists the
"items of

possible evidence" which were "seized pending further

investigation."

Following the list of documents and papers,

the report stated further:

"These items were all secured for

further investigation and as possible evidence."

Thus, inventory

of the seized items was made at the County Attorney's Office
some time following the seizure. (R-124, 154).
The report also described in general terms (e.g., "miscellaneous tools, fishing gear, mechanical equipment.") the items which
were not "secured."

Contrasting the nature of the items seized

and inventoried, "for further investigation" with those "not
secured" or inventoried in the report, (Exhibit D-6, Appendix
A), clearly establishes the investigatory nature of the seizure
and refutes any claim that the items were seized to protect the
property.

For example, a scrap of paper with numbers written

on it and a lawyer's business card were seized, inventoried and
photocopied, while tools and sporting equipment were not.
With the exception of the safety inspection sticker which
was improperly affixed to the windshield, Investigator Collins
had no probable cause to believe that any of the items and papers
which were seized were contraband, instrumentalities of an offense, or even evidence of an offense.

Investigator Collins

testified at the hearing on a motion to suppress that he attached
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no significance to the "ABC envelope" until a "confidential info:.
mant" asked to see the i terns seized because there was "something
in there we needed to know about."

(R-127)

Investigator Collins

showed a photocopy of the envelope to the informant who told

h~

that he had been told by the appellant that there was a stolen
semi-tractor stored at "ABC."
That information, along with further information derived
therefrom and the contents of the envelope (money orders for um
became the probable cause evidence contained in the affidavtt
for a search warrant of storage units at ABC Storage in Woods
Cross. (Exhibit D-3, Attached hereto as Appendix Bl

The

sear~

under that warrant produced the critical evidence linking appellant to the stolen semi-tractor, which was the subject of the
instant prosecution.
At the hearing on the motion to suppress, the envelope
the fruits of the ABC Storage search, appellant's counsel

a~

atte~~

ed to obtain the name of the person who was the informant because
appellant believed the informant was his lawyer's investigator.
(R-148-151)

The hearing court refused to compel Investigator

Collins to divulge whether or not the informant was appellant's
lawyer's agent. (R-151)

Defense counsel put on the undisputed

testimony of appellant, that he had discussed what was taken
in the seizure and his concern about the envelope and the stol~
semi-tractor with his attorney and the attorney's investigator,
Craig McLaglahn, in obtaining advice concerning the legality
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of the seizure.

(R-151-162)

Based upon this showing, defense

counsel again attempted to verify if the informant was party
to a privileged attorney-client conference because of the probable
violation of the constitutional right to counsel.

The State

objected, without any evidence or represention establishing a need
for preserving secrecy of the informant's name and the Court
sustained the objection.

(R-162-63) The appellant's motion to

suppress was denied although this does not appear in the record.
At trial, appellant's counsel objected to each item of evidence
which was the fruit of the seizure of appellant's papers and/or
the information on the grounds that the use of such evidence
violated the Fourth, Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United
States Constitution. The objections were overruled and appellant
convicted.
Following the conviction, appellant made a motion in arrest
of judgment based upon newly discovered evidence that the confidential informant, who told Investigator Collins that appellant
was concerned that an envelope which had been seized would lead
to a stolen truck, had obtained the information from a privileged
attorney-client conversation.

(R-65)

At the hearing on that motion, Investigator Collins testified
that:

At the time of the searches and seizures, investigating

the appellant was his "major project."

( R-239)

That the con-

fidential informant had told him that appellant was concerned
about the envelope which had been seized because it could lead the
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investigation to stolen property. (R-243) That among the papers
which were seized was a deed conveying property to Craig
McLaglahn's father and that he had discussed that document with
Craig McLaglahn.

(R-244)

That Collins knew McLaglahn was an

investigator for criminal defense attorneys and shared an office
with appellant's corporate lawyer.

(R-245)

That Collins ex-

changed information with McLaglahn and McLaglahn had given
tion regarding appellant.

(R-247-48)

inf~~

That Collins had told

McLaglahn that he did not want any information coming from an
attorney-client situation.

(R-248-49) That Collins had no know-

ledge that any information received from the confidential informant was from attorney-client conversation. (R-248-49)
The court sustained the State's objection to the ultimate
question of whether McLaglahn was the confidential informant,
but the court in doing so, stated he was assuming from the evidence that McLaglahn was the informant.

(R-254, 256)

The court

at that point also stated that the testimony of Collins indicat~
that the information regarding appellant's concern about the
seized envelope was obtained by McLaglahn from a source other
than an attorney-client conversation.

(R-256)

However, there

was no direct evidence that this was in fact true.

Collins had

only testified that he told McLaglahn that he did not want priri·
leged information (R-258-60) and that the confidential informant
told him he had heard the conversation at a trailer court. IR-2~
~~

~-

The whole thrust of this testimony was that Collins had no know·
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ledge that information came from attorney-client
(R-248, 249, 250) Collins, of course, could not testify as
where McLaglahn had, in fact, received the information.
Mr. David Bown testified he was an attorney at law.
he was retained by the appellant.

That

That McLaglahn was acting

as a defense investigator and that he had conditioned his acceptance of taking appellant's cases upon McLaglahn's assistance.
(R-267)

Mr. Bown testified that he had taken particular care

to clearly define McLaglahn's status so as to make information
McLaglahn obtained privileged because he was concerned about
McLaglahn receiving an investigative subpoena from the County
Attorney's Office.

(R-278)

Appellant came to Mr. Bown seeking

advice as to whether the papers seized by Collins could be legally
used and appellant expressed his concern particularly about the
ABC envelope because it could lead to a stolen truck. (R-267-69,
274)

Mr. Bown testified that the only other person present during

the conversation was McLaglahn. (R-270)
Appellant, again, testified that he had not expressed his
concern about the envelope to any other person.
It was the State's position on the motion in arrest of judgment that, if the information came

fro~

an attorney-client conver-

sation, the State had no knowledge that it did and, hence, there
was no state action involved.

The State further argued that

the conversation was not privileged because it pertained
going criminal conduct, the possession of stolen

to.~~

proper~y.
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court indicated that it rejected the latter argument.

(R-290)

The court took the matter under advisement and then denied
the motion.

The court stated in its order that the facts

cla~~

by the defendant were not supported by credible evidence.

(R-7Ji

ARGUMENT
POINT I: THE SEIZURE OF APPELLANT'S PAPERS VIOLATED THE
FOURTH AMENDMENT TO THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION
AND THE USE OF INFORMATION DERIVED THEREFROM TO OBTAIN
A SEARCH WARRANT RENDERED THE USE OF EVIDENCE SEIZED
THEREUNDER INADMISSABLE.
The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution state;
The right of the people to be secure
in their persons, houses, papers,
and effects against unreasonable searches
and seizures, shall not be violated
and no warrant shall issue, but upon
probable cause, supported by oath
or affirmation, and particularly
describing the place to be searched,
and the persons or things to be
seized.
With regard to the instant case, it should be noted that "papers"
are explicitly specified protected items and that the amendment
prohibits unreasonable seizures as well as unreasonable searches.
While appellant believes that the search of the vehicle
itself was unreasonable since it is rather clear that the investl·
gator serving the arrest warrant planned the arrest as a pretext
to search the vehicle, (see Exhibit D-6, attached hereto as Appendix Al it is not necessary for appellant to attack the sear~
since the seizure of the envelope for investigatory purposes
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was clearly unreasonable.

Thus, it is appellant's contention

that even if Investigator Collins had a right to go through the
contents of the vehicle which appellant was driving, he clearly
had no right to seize papers without any probable cause to believe
they were contraband or evidence.
Since there was no search warrant, the burden is upon the
State to show that the seizure of appellant's papers was within
one of the exceptions to the warrant requirement of the Fourth
Amendment.

McDonald v. United States, 335 U.S. 451, 456 (1948);

United States v. Jeffers, 342 U.S. 48, 51 (1951); United States v.
Murrie, 534 F.2d 695, 698 (6th Cir. 1976).
In the court below, the State argued that the search and
seizure came within the "routine impound inventory" and "plain
view" exceptions to the warrant requirement.
The "routine impound inventory" exception permits the necessary search of an impounded vehicle to make an inventory of its
contents to protect the owner's property interests, and to guard
against false claims of lost property.

South Dakota v. Opperman,

428 U.S. 364 (1975); State v. Criscola, 21 Utah 2d 272, 444 P.2d
517 (1968).

In the first instance, this was not a "routine impound inventory."

Investigator Collins did not list all items in the truck

at the time of the impound.

No such inventory was ever made--let

alone done as a part of the impound process with copies to the
tow truck driver and appellant.

Instead, Collins went through
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the items in the truck, and seized anything which might be of
evidentiary or investigative value and left unsecured and uninve:toried those items of no interest in his investigation of appellant.

Later, at the County Attorney's Office, ( R-120, 124, 1541,

he listed the seized items in his supplementary report as items
which "were all secured for further investigation and as possible
evidence."

(Exhibit D-6, attached hereto as Appendix Al.

The seized papers were not put away for safekeeping but
were photocopied (R-126,127) and shown to informants. (R-128,
187; Affidavit for Search Warrant, Defendant's Exhibit 2, attachec
hereto as Appendix Bl

The "ABC" envelope was torn open and the

contents studied, two money orders and a note stating "rent"
with the unit number of the storage unit which was ultimately
searched.

(R-124, Affidavit, Appendix Bl

The nature of the items "secured for further investigation
and as possible evidence" (Appendix Al

clearly demonstrates the

extremely broad scope of Investigator Collins' interest in appellant's business and associates.

In contrast, the nature

oft~

items not secured or inventoried demonstrates Collins' complete
lack of concern for protecting valuables which were in the vehicle.

Where the police do not make a complete list of the propert"

in an impounded vehicle but only list that which may be incrimi~
ting, it cannot be fairly characterized as an inventory search.
State v. Gluck, 518 P.2d 703, 707 (Wash. 19741.
The impound inventory search exception to the warrant requlr'
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ment cannot be used as a "pretext concealing an ir.vestigatory
police motive."

South Dakota v. Opperman, supra, at 375-76.

Here there was not even a pretext of an impound inventory until
the hearing on the motion to suppress.
However, even if Collins discovered the envelope during
a bona fide impound inventory search, he had no justification
whatsoever to seize it and use it in his continuing investigation.
At the time it was seized, he had no idea of its evidentiary
value. (R-128)

It was only when Craig McLaglahn told him that

appellant was worried about an envelope which Collins had seized
which could lead to a stolen truck, that Collins had anything like
probable cause to believe it was evidence of a crime.

Appellant

is not arguing the distinction between "mere evidence" and "fruits
or instrumentalities of a crime" because, when seized, the envelope was neither.

In the words of Investigator Collins, the

papers were seized "for further investigation and as possible
evidence."

(Defendant's Exhibit 3, Appendix A, p. 5) (Emphasis

added)
The "plain view" exception to the warrant requirement merely
excuses a search

~arrant

where an officer in the lawful course

of his duties sees contraband or otherwise seizeable articles-it does not dispense with probable cause and allow an officer
to seize anvtJ:iing he can see for further investigation.
In State v. Elkins, 422 P.2d 250 (Ore. 1966), it was held
that where an officer makes a lawful search and he observes some-
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thing which he does not know to be contraband but of which he
is suspicious, seizure of the item is unreasonable even though
his suspicion eventually proves well founded.

The court observed:

If the rule were otherwise, an
officer who desired to inculpate an
arrested person in another crime,
could seize everything in such
person's immediate possession and
control upon the prospect that on
further investigation some of it
might prove to have been stolen
or to be contraband. It would
open the door to complete temporary
confiscation of all an arrested
person's property which was in
his immediate possession and con
trol at the time of his arrest
for the purpose of a minute
examination of it in an effort
to connect him with another crime.
422 P.2d at 254.
The instant case presents an even more unreasonable seizun
than the seizure in Elkins, for here, Collins did not have even
a reasonable suspicion that the envelope was evidence of anything.

If the State's theory is upheld here, it would mean that

a police officer could arrest a lawyer, for example, on a parki~
ticket warrant, seize his brief case, and take it to the County
Attorney's office and photocopy the contents for leisurely
perusal. Or, an officer invited to a social worker's office could
seize and photocopy a psychologist's report because it was in
"plain view" from where he lawfully was.

It is difficult to

hypothesize a more serious infringement of the security of a
person's papers guaranteed by the Fourth Amendment, than the
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~

seizure which occured in the instant case.
In United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1 (1977), the United
States Supreme Court held that the opening of a locked footlocker, seized from a lawfully arrested person's vehicle, and which
the officers had ample probable cause to believe contained narcotics, was unreasonable without a warrant because a footlocker
is frequently a depository for personal papers and effects.
Here Investigator Collins, without probable cause, seized, not
a possible container for papers, but the papers themselves and
he opened a sealed envelope which he knew to contain papers.
A reading of the affidavit, (Appendix Bl, makes apparent the
extent to which the "ABC" envelope was used in developing the
probable cause for the search of the ABC Storage units in Woods
Cross.

Not only were the contents themselves described but the

information in the affidavit which was obtained from both the
informants and one witness was elicited by showing them the envelope or a photocopy.
B; R-187)

(Affidavit for Search Warrant, Appendix

Hence, the information obtained from the informants,

the manager of ABC Storage, and the evidence seized under the
search warrant were all "fruit of the poisonous tree" and should
have been suppressed.

~'

Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S.

471, 488 (1963); Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States, 251
U.S. 385 (1920).

The admission of that evidence at trial over

appellant's Fourth Amendment objection requires reversal.

~·

Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
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POINT II: THE AFFIDAVIT SUPPORTING THE
SEARCH WARRANT WAS !~ADEQUATE ON ITS FACE
TO PERMIT A MAGISTRATE TO MAKE AN EVALUATION
OF THE RELIABILITY OF THE INFORMATION
CONTAINED THEREIN.
Regardless of the legality of the means used to gather
information contained in the affidavit used to obtain the

t~

sear~

warrant for ABC Storage, appellant contends that information
was inadequate to enable the magistrate to evaluate its reliability.

Under Utah law, the information presented to a magistrate

to establish probable cause for issuance of a search warrant
must be given under oath and in writing.

Sections 77-54-3 throur

77-54-6, U.C.A. (1978 Ed.); State v. Jasso, 21 Utah 2d 24, 439
P.2d 844 (1968).

The affidavit submitted to the magistrate to

support the issuance of a search warrant for ABC Storage was
introduced into evidence at the hearing on appellant's motion
to suppress (Defendant's Exhibi t2) and is reproduced in Appendix:
of this brief.
While it is clear that hearsay information may be used to
develop probable cause for issuing a search warrant, it is eq~~
clear that the magistrate must be given sufficient information
to enable the magistrate to make an independent judgment as to
the credibility of the informant and the reliability of the infor·
mation.

Spinelli v. United States, 394 U.S. 410, 413 (19691;

United States v. Harris, 403 U.S. 573 (1971).
The information, in the affidavit, that a stolen semi-tractor was in the ABC Storage units was hearsay from an unnamed cc:
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dential informant and from Ron Lyle, a prison inmate.

There

is no information contained in the affidavit supporting the credibility of the confidential informant and no basis whatsoever
upon which the magistrate could have made a determination as
to his credibility.
The information from the prison inmate, Ron Lyle, was subject
in part, to verification but the critical connection to the ABC
Storage was not.

In the court below, the State argued that Lyle's

information was a statement against penal interest.

However,

the affidavit does not state whether or not Lyle was given immunity or offered any benefit for his information.

The State should

not be allowed to mislead a magistrate into assuming a statement
is a confession subjecting the declarant to liability, by remaining silent about the circumstances when a full disclosure of the
circumstances surrounding the statement would indicate otherwise.
Furthermore, while the details of Lyle's statement concerning
the theft of the semi-tractor were incriminating to himself and
to an extent verifiable, the information that the semi-tractor
had been turned over to appellant and stored at ABC Storage was
neither self-incriminating nor verified.

Rather, it was a classic

statement of an accomplice incriminating another in his crime.
In addition, Lyle's claim that he saw the truck in the storage
units in December of 1977, did not give probable cause to believe
it was still there eleven months later.
Thus the magistrate had before him only the hearsay statement
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from a source about which he knew absolutely nothing and the
hearsay statement of a convicted felon and accomplice that the
truck had been in the storage unit ten months earlier, made under
unknown circumstances regarding immunity and reward for implicating appellant.

This information clearly failed to meet the test

of Spinelli, supra.

See, also, Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108

( 1964).

POINT III: THE COURT HEARING THE MOTION
TO SUPPRESS ERRED IN REFUSING TO COMPEL
DISCLOSURE OF WHETHER OR NOT SOME OF THE
INFORMATION USED TO OBTAIN THE SEARCH WAP.RANT
CAME FROM A PRIVILEGED ATTORNEY-CLIENT
COMMUNICATION.
At the hearing on the motion to suppress, it became apparent
to appellant that the confidential informant, who had informed
Collins that appellant was concerned about an envelope which
Collins had seized because it could lead to a stolen truck, must
have been the defense invesigator who was present when appellant
sought legal advice about the seizure.*
Section 78-24-8(5), U.C.A. (1953 Replacement) provides:
A public officer cannot be examined as to
communications made to him in offical confidence
when the public interests would suffer by the
disclosure.

*Citations to the record supporting factual assertions are
contained in the Statement of Facts, supra.
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However, here there was no showing by the State that the
confidential informant made the statement to Collins "in official
confidence" even if it is assumed that Collins is a "public
officer."

What is more important, there was no showing whatsoever

that "the public interests would suffer by the disclosure."
Concealing a violation of a breach of the attorney-client confidence, particularily in a criminal case where Sixth Amendment
rights are involved, certainly is not in the public interest.
This ruling effectively prevented appellant from raising
the Sixth Amendment violation (discussed infra in Point IV) before
the judge who was ruling on the motion to suppress.

While appel-

lant had an opportunity to raise the issue later before a different judge on a motion in arrest of judgment, it is submitted
that appellant had a right to have the judge who was deciding
whether or not to suppress the evidence review all constitutional
defects in the obtaining of the warrant including evidence that
part of the information came from a constitutionally privileged
source.
The judge who heard the motion in arrest of judgment was
necessarily the trial judge whose duty it was to enter judgment.
Furthermore, a motion in arrest of judgment is only vaguely defined under Utah law and there are no standards regarding burden
proof.

See Section 77-35-10 U.C.A. (1977 Ed.)

What in effect is

a collateral attack after conviction is no substitute for presenting evidence to the judge making the ruling on the motion to
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suppress.

The United States Supreme Court has on two occasions

refused to utilize post-conviction fact finding as a remedy when
the possiblity of an intrusion on attorney-client communications
came to light after conviction, and, instead, summarily vacated

the conviction and remanded for trial so that the defendant coulc
adequately protect himself against the use of tainted evidence.
Black v. United States, 385 U.S. 26 (1966); O'Brien v. United
States, 386 U.S. 345 (1967).
Because of the lack of foundation showing that the information sought fell within the "official communication" privilege
of Section 78-24-8, the court erred under Utah law in sustaining

the objections to divulging whether the informant was the defun
investigator.

Even if the statute protected any information

t~

State wished to call "confidential," such a statute would have t1
yield to inquiry necessary to protect Sixth Amendment interests.
This error can only be rectified by reversal and remand for
further proceedings on the motion to suppress in the event t~t
this Court does not reverse on grounds raised in the other point

POINT IV: THE USE OF INFORMATION BY THE
STATE OBTAINED FROM A DEFENSE INVESTIGATOR
WHO WAS PRIVY TO ATTORNEY-CLIENT COMMUNICATIONS
VIOLATED THE FOURTH, SIXTH AND FOURTEENTH
AMENDMENTS TO THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION
AND ARTICLE 1, SECTION 12 OF THE CONSTITUTION
OF UTAH.
The issue addressed in this point was raised before the
trial court by means of a motion in arrest of judgment .(R-6 41
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The court's denial of the motion because he found that the facts
claimed by the appellant were not supported by credible evidence
(R-73) is perplexing because there was little factual dispute
at the hearing on the motion.
There was no question that the investigation of this case
began when a confidential informant came to Investigator Collins
and informed him that appellant had expressed concern about an
envelope which Collins had seized because it could lead to where
a stolen truck was stored.

(R-243)

That information was included

in the Affidavit for Search Warrant. (Exhibit D-3, Appendix Bl
While the court would not compel Collins to state whether or
not the confidential informant was Craig McLaglahn, the court
stated he was assuming it was. (R-254)

David Bown, an attorney

at law, testified that appellant came to him seeking advice on
the legality of the seizure of the envelope, that Craig McLaglahn
was present as a paid investigator for Mr. Bown, and that appelant had expressed concern that the envelope could lead to where
a stolen truck was stored.

(R-262,

testified to the same effect.

~· ~·

(R-282,

l

The appellant

et.~.)

This evidence

was not disputed or contradicted.
The only factual contention involved appellant's testimony
that he had not discussed the envelope seizure except with his
attorney.

(R-283)

Somewhat opposed to this was Collins' testi-

mony that he had told McLaglahn he did not want information from
attorney-client sources (R-258) and McLaglahn had told him that
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the information came from conversations at a trialer court.
(R-253) Neither side was willing to call McLaglahn as a witness,
so there was no evidence that McLaglahn followed instructions
or told Collins the complete truth.
In the absence of any findings of fact or conclusions of
law, it is difficult to determine the basis of the court's
ing below.

rea~~

Surely, the court did not find that Mr. Bown was

not telling the truth under oath on the strength of what XcLaglar:
told Collins about the source of his information.

It is appel-

lant' s contention, supported infra, that the undisputed evidence
shifted the burden to the State to establish that McLaghlan had
obtained the information in some way completely unconnected

~~

his capacity as agent for appellant's attorney.
Looking at the evidence in the light most favorable to

t~

State, it is submitted that the most that can be said, and this
seems to have been the State's position below, is that the prose·
cution was not aware that the information came from an attorneyclient communication and had not intended to intrude on the attor·
ney-client relationship.

1

The law is quite clear that placing a double agent in a
defense camp requires revers a 1 .
205 F.2d 879 (D.C. Cir. 1953).

I

I

~ , .::C.::a..::l.:::d:.::w:..::e:.. :1:.. :1=--v.:_:_.-=U..:.cn:..::i:...:t:...:e:...:d=--S_t_a_~· I

In Caldwell, the agent had, like\
I

McLaglahn, been warned against getting involved in attorney-die:'
conversations.

However, when the agent learned that the attorM··

and defendant were plotting another crime, caution was thrown
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to the wind, and the agent reported regularly to the prosecution
while working as a defense aid.

The court vacated the conviction,

holding that the breach of the right to counsel compelled reversal
without any showing of prejudice.
In Black v. United States, 385 U.S. 26 (1966), the Supreme
Court summarily vacated a conviction when the Solicitor of the
United States informed the Court that the F.B.I. had tapped telephone conversations and had furnished notes to the prosecutors.
According to the representation of the Solicitor, upon which
the Court was acting, the Tax Division which was prosecuting
had not thought the material relevant to the prosecution and
was not aware the notes contained any attorney-client information
until a year after the trial.
In O'Brien v. United States, 386 U.S. 345 (1966), the Solicitor again informed the Court that the F.B.I. had intercepted
a phone call wherein the defendant had requested his lawyer to
get the territorial limits on his bail conditions changed.

No

information regarding any calls was ever communicated outside
the F.B.I., but, again, the Court summarily vacated the conviction.
The inference from Black and O'Brien is that

~breach

of secrecy of attorney-client communications, per se, requires
reversal and the dissents in those cases noted that.

However

in Weatherford v. Bursey, 429 U.S. 545 (1977), the majority rejected the interpretation stating:
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If anything is to be inferred
from these two cases [Black and
O'Brien] with respect "[()the right
to counsel, it is that when conversations with counsel have been
overheard, the constitutionality
of the conviction depends on
whether the overheard conversations
have produced, directly or·indirectly
any of the evidence offered at
trial. 429 U.S. at 553.
In Weatherford, an undercover agent had been arrested along
with some bona fide demonstrators.

To maintain his cover he

was charged and retained his own counsel.

Ee attended a

meeti~

with a co-defendant's lawyer, again to maintain his cover, but
communicated nothing that he learned to the prosecution.

His

testimony at trial was confined to events preceding arrest.
The Court held:
There being no tainted evidence,
no communication of defense
strategy to the prosecution,
and no purposeful intrusion by
Weatherford, there was no violation
of the Sixth Amendment as it is
applicable to the states by virtue
of the Fourteenth Amendment.
429 U.S. at 558.
Regardless of what inferences can now be drawn from ~
and O'Brien, the inference from Weatherford, itself, is that
where the overheard attorney-client "have produced, directly
or indirectly, any of the evidence at trial" a Sixth Amendment
violation does occur.

429 U.S. at 553.

It should be noted that

the Court found that the agent Weatherford had no intent to violate the attorney-client privilege.
-22-

In the instant case,
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McLaglahn certainly had the intent to violate the attorney-client
privilege and did so on behalf of the State, even if Collins
did not and had instructed McLauglahn not to relay attorney-client
conversations.
However, intent or motive should play a small part in determining the result of an infringement of the attorney-client confidence.

Caldwell v. United States, supra; Barber v. Municipal

Court, 48 Law Week 2207, (Cal. Sup. Ct. 1979) (Decided on State
Constitution grounds.)

The point is that defendants must have

absolute confidence that what they reveal to their lawyers will
not and cannot be used against them if they are to have effective
assistance of counsel.

The Sixth Amendment right to counsel

could be rendered meaningless if that confidence were violated
by the lawyer himself without ~ intent, or indeed knowledge,

the part of the prosecutor.
Perhaps the clean hands or lack thereof of the prosecutor
or the agent's superiors would be relevant where, as in Caldwell,
supra, or Barber, supra, little or no prejudice could be demonstrated, or in deciding whether the remedy should be suppression
or out-right dismissal.

However, here where the disclosure

started the whole chain of the investigation, the prejudice is
obvious and the question of suppression versus dismissal is not
particularly meaningful because suppression would result in dismissal any way.
If this Court does not wish to enter the Sixth Amendment
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thicket, then, it is respectfully submitted that reversal on
this point could be grounded on Section 12 of Article One of
the Constitution of Utah or on the Court's general supervisory
powers over the judiciary and bar.

Surely, the people of this

State in seeking advice from a lawyer have a right to have

abs~

lute confidence that what they tell the lawyer will not turn
up in an affidavit for a search warrant.

CONCLUSION
It is respectfully submitted that the massive use of

evi~m

obtained in violation of the State and Federal Constitutions

r~

quires reversal of the conviction, and, since it is apparent
that without the illegally obtained evidence a conviction could
not be obtained, remand with instructions to dismiss the information.

In the alternative, appellant requests that this Court

establish guidelines as to the burden of proof in determining
whether a violation of the attorney-client privilege occurred
and remand for further proceedings on the motion to suppress
and a new trial if appropriate.

Respectfully submitted,

JOHN D. O'CONNELL
Attorney for Appellant
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Served two (2) copies of Appellant's Brief upon the Attorney
General by leaving the same at his office at the Utah Capitol
on this

day of March, 1980.
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ARREST OF LESTER RALPH ROXERO
August 25, ~978, at approximately 0750 hours, I proceeded to the area
of the suspect s home. I made a drive past the susoect's heme and obOn

served in and around the suspect' s home four vehicles.

There was a

white over green Thunderbird. There was a green Chevette and a green
Volkswagon and a light blue over dark blue Ford oickuo truck with a
camper.
·
I then proceeded to park on 6200 South at approximately 1800 West. Ac
approximately 0815 hours, Sgt. Dennis Harwood from the Salt Lake County
Sheriff's Office joined me and set up surveillance west of the susoect's
home.
·
At approximately 0830 hours, Sgt. Har•ood contac:ed me by radio and
advised that the suspect had just left his home and had gotten into the
blue Ford pickup truck with the camper.
I then started the engine in my vehicle, pulled for•ard, and observed
the sus?ect as he came to the stop sign at 2200 West on 6200 South.
Suspect made a right turn and proceeded eastbound on 6200 South. I
made a U-turn prior to the suspect getting to my location; and as the
suspect passed, I pulled in behind the suspect and awaited Sgt. Harwood's
arrival to stop the suspect with his red light. However, orior to
Sgt. Harwood's arrival, I obse,,-ved the suspect pull his pickuo truck
to the right and off the roadway and turn off the engine.
I exited my vehicle and proceeded to meet the suspect at the left rear
corner of his pickup truck. I there displayed my badge and identification card and requested the suspect to produce a driver's license.
Suspect pulled out his wallet from his right hip poc&et and started
looking through it. The suspect appeared to be quite nervous and his
hand was visibly shaking. The suspect did not apoear to be locating
a driver's license.
I asked the suspect if he had a driver's license and he stated that he
did. He continued :o look but was not able to come uo with one. I
then asked the susoect if he had any kind of identification. He then
gave me a card, typewritten, with his name and address on it. He asked
what this was all about. I advised him that I had an outstanding
warrant for his arrest.
At this ti~e Sg:. Dennis Har•ood had ?arked his vehicle to the rear of
mine and had come forNard. Mr. Romero was advised as to the charges
against him and taken to Sgt. Harwood' s car and given a field search
by Sgt. Harwood.
0

1

Sgt. ::ar.r1ood, at my request, then removed the suspect's wallet and I
looked through the wallet and asked the suspect if there was any cash
!!!Oney in the wallet for security reasons. He wanted to know why I was
interested in cash ~oney, and I advised him that it ~as for security
~ur~oses so that u~on his arrival at the jail i: there was any money
~i~h him at the tiMe of ar~est, that there would be an agreement as to
hew

OISl>OSIT•ON

~uch

that

~as.

Suspect stated that

1NVESTtGATOAS S1GNATUAE

t~ere ~as

DATE

I

no money in his wallet.

Ai'PAOVEO BY
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I then continued to look through the wallet and located a te~oorarv
driver's license, #C22495S, a Class C license signed by Leste~ la~h ,
Romero.
It indicated it ~as a duplicate license orom ~523-36-8859.
The suspect's wallet was then ::-etu~ed to him ar.c! he was placed in t~e
1
=ronc seat of Sgt. Harwood's vehicle.
,
A check was then run through the Sheriff's frequency disoatche= to
determine the status of Mr. Romero's driver's license. The Sheriff s
Oispatc~er Frequency T-'.Jo advised t:tat Mr. Romero's driver's license ·.oa!
susoenC.ed. The license in his i:>ossession indicated an examination dat1
of 6-27-78 and an expiration date of 9-27-78.
1

I then took a copy of the warrant #78-CRS-368 and gave a cooy of the
".Jarrant to Mr. Romero.
I then re:noved !1r. Romero from Sgt. ?.ar-Nood's
vehicle and advised him of his Constitutional rights f:-om the .standa:-j
P.O.S.T. Rights Card. This was at approximately .J845 hours. Mr. Ro'!r:
stated that he understood his rights.
Mr. Romero's vehicle was stopped at 0833 hours and he was arres tea at
0835 hours.
After reading Mr. !!.o:nero his rights, I asked him who C'.<ned t!'!e vehide.
He asked me why I wan:ed to know.
I advised Mr. RornerJ t~at it ~ace a
difference as to what action was taken in regards to t~e vehicle. I
advised him that if the veh:.cle was his property that we would orobabl·:
do with it as he directed and that if he wanted it .parked a<id locked
we would probably do that.
! advised him, however, that if t;;e •1ehicl'
did not belong to hi:o that we would contact the party to '"hem it did
belong and advise them where they would be able to locate t!'!e vehicle.
Mr. Ro~ero then stated that the vehicle belonged to Go:den Circle
Invest?:lent Corporation.
I asked Xr. Romero who I should contact at
Golden Circle and he stated t:.at I should contact Bill Harni:ton. I
asked him if he could advise me how to get a hold of Mr. Ha~ilton aod
he stated that he could not understand wI-.y I wanted to kno·• s'..nce I had
been at Mr. Hamilton's ho!Ile just the day before.
I advised ~1r. ~o'.':le:o
that that was correct; however. I was not going to t-:-avel to ~r. Hamil:~
home at this time.
If he had a te leohone number for >tr. :Iarni l ton, I
would contact him. He stated that he had none.
I then asked him what his connection with Golden Circle Inves ::nent ·..;as
He stated that he was t~e ~aintenance raan for Golden Circle and then
declined to make any f~rther statement.
I then contacted via County Attorney radio frequency Greg 30.,,,, and ''''''

hi~ of the si:uation.
Prior to doing this, however, Sgt. Ear~ood had.
as~ed Xr. Romero for ::iermission to search the vehicle, and he had declL:.~

giving such permission.
After advising Greg Bo""'n of t?i.e situation, I requested in::::J!l:laticn as::
what action to take conce=-ning securing or releasing t~e vehicle. Mr
B~~ advised that the vehicle should be seized as evidence.
Coon
receiving this inior.nation, Sgt. Har"'.¥ood ::-equested :::.:;m t~e Sherif: s
1
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frequency a wrecker for evidence imt>ound.

Har~on's

to

t~e

The Sheriff then disoatched

1

66 Service Wrecker. Mr. Harmon, from the wrecker coT.Pany, came
scene and subseque~cly im?ounded t~e vehicle ~r. ~cmero was in at

2860 West 3500 South, Salt Lake City, Utah 84119, tele~hone nu.~ber
969-4749. No further action was taken toward the truck until the arrival
of Mr. Hanion.
Upon Mr. Har~on's arrival, ~yself and Sgt. Harwood did an inventory of
the contents of the vehicle. We found in the cab of the vehicle several
items which appear to be items of possible evidence. These items were
seized pending further investigation.

':hese items consisted of

t~e

following:
l.

A 1978 vehicle registration for the vehicle which was impounded,
a 1970 Ford pickup, license i!WS 4921. This registration indicated
the owner of the vehicle as Golden Circle Invest~ent, Box 15998
(2255 West North Tempce, Salt Lake City). The vehicle, however,
was signed owner's name - Golden Circle by Lester Romero.

2.

A letter addressed to Ervin Romero, Box 15998, Salt Lake Ci:y,
Utah 84115. This letter being from :he Douvall Press Finance
Publications.

3.

A letter addressed to Gary Nyer, 8701 West 3500 South,
had the return address of Royal Acceptance Corporation
City and through that was scratched the address of 338
South and the address 6266 South Morgray Drive printed
top {:his is the suspect Romero's home address).

4.

A card from John E. Runyand, Attorney at Law, Salt Lake City.

5.

A check ~ade out to Rotostripper for $12.95. The check was on the
First Security Bank of Utah, 1,151-14015-23. It was signed Lester
Romero and had been cashed. The address on the check for Romero
was 616 Colorado Street, Salt Lake City, 84084. However, that had
been written through and the address of 6266 South Morgray Drive
had been written in. The check was paid by the bank on February 21,
1978.

6.

Also in the front seat was found a copy of a Quit-Claim Deed from
Lester Romero and Maxine Ro~ero to Golden Circle Incon>orated. This
was notarized by ~argo Bartholomew. Tiiere was a state~ent on the

Magna. It
in Salt Lake
East 100
over the

ot~er side to che effect that it was a true cooy of an original
document. On this was also written "Defendant's Exhibit 17-D."

7.

Also in the truck was found in the cabin an Abst=act of Title prepared by Alex E. Carr Company on the same property as related in
t~e Quit-Claim Deed.

8.

Also in the vehicle was a copy of a registration for a trailer,

A 60797, indicating the owner's name as Don ~urst, dba S & T.

!'his was signed by Don Hurst; however, the signature appeared to
be t~at of Lester Romero's.

OATE

I

APP~OViDIY
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9.

There was also a customer's copy of a Wa!ker :Sank ~ar.~americard Tia'.
out to Geraldine P. Barker and signed by Ronald 3ar~er for a tota;"
of $9.51. The invoice was to Quinn's Auto Parts.

10.

There was another one to Genuine Auto Parts on the same credit cc~~
signed by Ronald Barker. However, the signature on these two in'lo'.:
appeared to be different.
Invoice in 1!9 for $9. 51 was lft5083663 and the invoice in 1110 for
$27.39 was #5144421.

11.

The next item found was a note indicating ;:>a:n!lent of $:!., 007. 00 fo,
Industrial Power of some type.

12.

Next item was a letter from the Murray City Corporation to :-!ur:ay
Trailer Court, Box 15998, Salt Lake City, l:tah apparently regarding
the disconnection of service of elect:<icity, water, and sewage.

13.

There were also t-.ro bank statements for Golden Circle from the Her'.·
Bank & Trust, 4129 South 1750 West in Salt Lake City. The bank
statements were in effect deposit receipts, one for $2, 888. 52 and
another for $858.28.
There was also a check made payable to Industrial Power for Sl,07l
on the Golden Circle Investment account. The check was dated 7-iJ.'
and was check 1;155 and was signed by Dale S:nit.h.

14.

15.

There was also a yellow piece of oaoer which stated "Received f:oo
Les Romero August 15th $15. 00 for· a· refrigerator." It was signed

"Beverly E. Etherington."
16.

There were also three keys to some Chrysler-type vehicle.

17.

The next item 'N'aS a bulk mailing circular to Ervin ?.err.ere at Box i;:
Salt Lake City. On the other side, in what appea:<ed to be Lester
Romero's handwriting, was a membership request form filled out for

18.

Next item was a sealed envelope with two one-cent stamps on it ar.~
addressed to A B C, 2250 South 300 '..lest, Woods Cross, Utah 84087.
The return adc!ress was to Brother Dis Co, at 3955 South State, Salt
Lake City, Utah. Through the envelope co\!ld be seen what ap?ea'~d
to be checks. I then opened the envelope and found two money om::.
one for $30. 00; jft04- 704, 887, 078 ir:ade out to A B C. This was on .
State Savings & Loan Association.
I also found one !l".ade payable 7~:,
$35. 00 1!04-710, 300, 860 also made payable to A B C. There was a '"'"
of paper in the envelope which said "Art "..Jell i/85 I think." Also !
in the envelope was what appeared to be a piece of chipped r~.ines~c:=:
or possibly a diamond.

a three-year

19.

me~bership

in apparently some type of a club.

Ne~t item found was a checkbook with checks to Ro~ert Dolan, 735 ~~:·:
North Te!Ilple, 261-9267 on t'1e Valley Bank & Trust at 1225 South ,.I
Redwood Road, account #09-11-653-2. T:-iere was one check r.iade ?'Y"'
to cash in the checkbook, check lrl34 for $2, 000 :'or ?.obe:-t and s'.('
simply "Robert.." This c't.e.:.k •,.·as dated 7-1'3-78.
"I:"-:ere ·..:as no c:-.ec.(
reg~ster in the checkbook itself.

l

U4TE
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Salt Lake County Attorneys Office
Criminal Division

~E,CFITEO

CFFE'l.ISE .\S

'CODE VtCl.ATION

20.

I 21.

CATE PEPCATEO

OATE OCCUAREO

'C.:.S5. "oUM8EGJ

.lOORESS

COMPLAINANT

CVTSIOE "GENCY & CASE ~IJWBER

BUSINESS PMCNE

Next item was a receipt from Western Alternator & Generator Starter

Company made out as "Sold to !lon Barker, 2780 South State" and the
sum of $13.00 received as authorized signature Lester !lomoer. Total
bill ·•as $16. 27.
There was also a promissory note for $5,000 dated 8-21-78 from the
Broadway Office of Zion's First National Bank. It was apparently
a 30-dar, note to be r~paid 9-20-78. Person signing it was "Al
Johnson'. Al Johnson signing it both places, giving as his address
as 736 North West Temple, Salt Lake City, Utah.

22.

"nlere was also a checkbook for Beaver Investments on the Zion's

23.

Also there was a piece of paper indicating license plate for dump
truck #A 60797. This numoer matches the registration found in the
truck signed by Don Hurst.

24.

There was also a Warranty Deed wherein N. W. McLachlan, granter
conveying property to Sirren Bybee of Salt Lake City. T:iis document,
however, was not notarized, but it was signed purporting to be the
signature of N. W. McLachlan.

25.

Also in the vehicle was a partial Utah plate, sticker number Utah
'79 and it had the month 2 on it and was sticker #91486. This was
found in the rear behind the actual seat itself.

26.

In the rear of the truck was found a box. On the box was an
The
letter was apparently mailed July 11, 1978 and was mailed to Dale
Smith, Box 15998, Salt Lake City, Utah.

First National Bank, 102 South Main Street, Salt Lake City, account
#01-13343-8, check made out 8-24-78 and #611 signed Al Johnson. The
check was blank being payable to no one for no specific amount.

envelope from "The Greenhouse" from Great ~eek, New York.

These items were all secured for further investigation and as possible
evidence.

Also in the truck items which were left in the truck and were not secuTed.
The following items were found in the cab of the truck'

l.

One AC fuel pump

2.

T-wo sets of miscellaneous keys

3.

One old fuel pump

4.

:"here •,;ere miscellaneous tools and small items of that nature.

5.

There were other papers and other minor items such as a cup, tooth
~rush and things of that nature.

In the rear of the vehicle items which were left are ·as follows'

I

l.

One spare tire with the rim with the tire in tack.

2.

A toolbox ~ade of wood ~ith miscellaneous-type tools inside.

::ltSl'OSITION

j

INVESTIGATORS SIG'llATUAE

! .-,,PPAOVE081'
I
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j coce v10•.AT10N

OFFE!\ISE AS REi'OR':'EO

j o•TE ACPOATEO

I

DATE occuRREo

a.

se .,.u-..eei:i.

1ours1:;e .i.ce-.cv, :•st·..

RES•OE'llCE PHONE

AOORESS

A.001TIONAL INFORMATION

i:. .

l

I
SYNOPSIS

3.

There were two high-lift jacks and other oiiscellaneous tools scatte:;:
across the bed of the truck.

4.

There were a number of other types of miscellaneous fishing gear and
mechanical equipment.

Prior to leaving the scene, the vehicle was impounded.

See Sheriff's

Department Report #78-60205.
Mr. Romero was then taken to the Salt Lake County Jail where he was boo<ei
Also included in the items taken was a Motorola Metro-Page Soy, '10994i.
Mr. Romero was booked into jail at

approxi~ately

0935 hours.

Propr to the truck being i~pounded, l also noticed that the green Safety
Inspection sticker did not appear to be stuck to the window. A closer
examination revealed that the sticker was ta~ed on with scotch tape and

had no writing on the back. This sticker was very easily re~oved and
secured as evidence. Also taken into evidence was driver's license
C224958 and secured as evidence as

OISl'".:SIT!O!ll

':"NESTIGAiTQRSSIGNAiT\JRE

~ell.

I

::.>.TE

1

"""P~OYEOBV

\
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DEFENDANT'S
EXHIBIT

I LR,.'1~~/0JG

INTHE

CIRCUIT

------

BOUNTI?'UL CITY

DAVIS
COUNTY OF _ _
_ _~;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;:;;.:•_;ST~A~TE OF UTAH

DEFl:i:::l~T"S

SALT LAKE COUNTY,)
STATE OF UTAH

COURT

:n-~

)ss.

,.-D•E•FE•NmD•A•N!..l
I . EXHlllT

_:.t_'">7,"-q(,T

;

f NO.

AFFIDAVIT FOR
SEARCH WARRANT
BEFORE

I

745 South Main, Bountiful, Uta~

S. Mark Johnson
JUDGE

ADDRESS

The undenicned beinc tirst duly sworn deposes and says:

Thai ho

Thal

't~li~~
(has reason to believe)
J«lllC~X

,2250 South 800 West Woods Cro"

A B C Stora~e/consistin~ of 4 set"arate concrete bl~

buildings containinl'; 128 rental unit storage "'"'"

(on the prtmises known 11) building 113 units 76 and 85 bein~ comected storaie
...ru.ch are 12 x 12 x 60 feet storage ~arages rented:
~¥1l1<4¥llll4iX~!C A B C in t.1'\e nam? of Art Wall

In the City ol Woods Cross
, County or
Stall of Utah, there is now cert~in proswrty, namely,

l

I
'

Davis

A 1975 Conventional Kenworth Tractor Truck
Model W 9M
Vin ~143758S or VIN 111333833
or Darts of that truck includin~ a 425 Cateroillar diesel ene,ine
Minnesota license olate PR 20326
Ownershio or registration pacers or said vehicle in the name of ~ax
DeFlorin, 964 West Country Road, St. ?aul "linnesota, or F'abre~e !ne
~•Kett.a Division . St. Paul, Minnesota or any nersonal orooerty ident!

an t •l 511 property con~\atute5:
able as belcnging to "1ax T)eflorin or his wi·1
()(SLul•n ur emhirul"od pr11perty
( • Pruperty used n a means or committinc a Celony
(.(' Prop•rly or things in the possession oC 1 penon with the intent to uu it as a means of commiltini
a public offense or in the posseuion or another to where he m1y hne delivered at tor the purpOP
of conce111linc it or preventine it.s lJeint discovered
( ) Controlled substances ind any Jevice, instrument, or paraph1.n1li1 wed for conaumin1, inhalinc.
or to Cacihlillt the d1stributiun or production of controlled 1ubstances

Th• Cacti to est.ibllsh the i:rounds ror issuance or

I

Search W1n1nt are:

Your affiant is and at all times mentioned he:-ein as been an Investi~ator
emoloyed by the Salt Lake County Attorney's Officer, and a Peace Officer~"'
Deouty Sheriff for the Salt Lake Countv Sheriff's Office.
On 8-25-78 your affiant arrested Lester Ralnh !lomero at 1800 West 6200 Soot\
Salt Lake County.
At the time of his arrest and pursuant to his arrest, the truck which he''"
driving, a 1970 Ford oickuc truck was seized. An inventory search was done
that vehicle. On the front seat of the vehicle was an envecooe with a retu;
a-dress of BRODISCO 3955 South State Street. Salt Lake City, Vtah ~4115 . .:
envelooe had two one-cent star.tos en it and was acdressed to A B C 2250 Sout'
800 West, Woods Cross, Utah 84087.
Inside that envelooe were two mone:1 o!'-ders !'.ror.i State Savi:i.2s f.t. Loan Comuan~
One was J!04 710- 300-860 in the amount of $ 35. 00. The oavee on it was A C,.
it was not dated. The second one was 1!04-704,887,870 for 531.00. :he ,ave!
being A S C with no date on it.

°

These two money ·orders were inside a "Oiece of oaner that had the name .\rt ';a'.
i!85 ! thir.k (this was handwritten "I t':1'!.nk" was also writ::e:i. en the oaJe~~,,
On the back were a number of figures and the ;vcrd "rent" wri::en wit':! an ·
through the figu!'es.
A check with the July 1978 Salt Lake Cit? :'e:leohone :Jirecto!"·t and 3diacent
town directorv indicated t~at A S C was a s:ora2e ·.:Orr:."Jan:1 and t·'."la'.: i.: ·HS~:
the address indicated on the envelorye_
Con:::..nued en

:>:!?€

1"..JC
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Your affiant on 10-23-78 sooke with a confidential
informant, who observed a copy of the front of this envelooe
to A B C. lie staced that he had been told bv Lester Ral:>h
Romero in the oresence of other oeoole that inside of the
stora11:e units at A B C there was a stolen semi-tractor. He
stated that he had had this inform4tion as of a~oroximately
ten days orior to the date of this interview which was 10-23-78.
This infor1114nt seated that he did not want his name
used in any legal ?roceedings hecause he feared retaliation

aeainst him in the form of ohvsical injury to himself or to
his family.

On 10-24-78 your affiant talked with Ron Lvle, who is
presently an inmate of the l!tah State Prison. Lvle advised
that aoproximatelv a vear and a half ago durine the su!'llT1er of
1977, he was aporoached bv Lester Raloh ~omero, who asked Lvle
to go to Provo, Utah and steal a Kenworth tractor that L·11e·
could find at a particular location. Lyle stated that his
best recollection was that it was a Kenworth Conventional
tractor which was biege in color and he believed a 1972 to
1973 model tractor. He seated chat it had a Caterpillar
en11:ine in it, a 13-soeed Fuller transmission, it had a sleener,
no C.B. radio, it had men and women's clothinR in it, all
black interior, and oolished aluminum wheels. He stated it
had what aopeared to be new General tires also on the vehicle.
He stated that at the request of Lester Ralnh Romero
he traveled to Provo, Utah with another individual and there
entered this truck and stole it. L·1le stated that when he
stole it, the truck was in a large emoty lot across from the
Ramada Inn directly opposite the golf course in Provo, l!tah.
Lyle stated that at the time he went down that it had started
to rain and that during the time he drove the truck from Provo
to Salt Lake it was raining.
Lyle stated that he drove the truck from Provo, Utah
to aooroximately 60th South and West Temole in Salt Lake County
where he met Lester Ralph Romero and ~urned the truck over to
Romero. He stated that he received Sl,000 from Romero for
stealing the truck.
Lyle stated that sometime later the truck was cainted
black and silver. He stated that shortly after that he had had
a conversation with Lester Ralnh Romero in which Romero stated
that the Sheriff's Department had sconced him at 2100 South
and had arrested him. Ile stated that they had taken at that
time a brief case which contained a rental receiot to the
garage at 60th South and West Temple. He stated as a result
the truck needed to be moved.
Lyle advised your

af~iant

that he and a relative of

his then went to ~·J'oods Cross to a mini-s :or age yard there and

rented a storage unit

unde~

he oelieved the name of Don

~alone.

He stated that he renteC three units at that time and that
t~ose units were turned over to the control of Lester Raloh

Romero, who placed cadlocks on the units and who

~aintained

and retained the keys to those units.

He further stated that after

bein~

advised by Lester

Raloh ~omero of the necessity to move the vehicle that it ~as
cransoorted bv a friend a: ~is from 60th South and olaced inside

c!"le r!l.ini-stora~e unit.
He stated that he had bee:n to!.d by
Lester ~al~h Romero that he ~ad dor.e work on chat tractor at
c":--.e mini-storage uni~. but he Jid not actually see the wo7'<.
He stated, however, that ~e did 20 to the mini-~torage ~nit on
several occasions and did see c~e work as described ~y ~ester
~aloh ~omero had been done on the tractor.
He stated f~r:her
that he last saw the craccor i~ the nini·sto~a~e unit i~
::ece-:r:ber of 1977 with the tires anC wheels removed.
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Your affiant talked to the aforesaid confidential
informant on 10-23-78 and he was advised of the color of the
tractor in the mini-storage unit on Woods Cross was black and
silver.
On 10-24-78 your affiant talked to Lt. Bud G. Gillman
of Provo City Police Department. He stated that a Stolen
Motor Vehicle Reoort was filed with Provo City Police Decartment which indicated the following.

A Max De Florin of 964 West Coutnrv Road. St. Paul,
had been in Provo with a 1975 Conventional Kenworth
tractor, Model '.1 900 VP! 1}1437585 en Jul:- 1, 1977
'le stated
that DeFlorin recorted that his tractcr had heen stolen sometime during the night of 7-1-77 and 7-2-77. He stated the
reoort was made at aonroximately 1,00 A.~. on 7-2-77.

~innesota

He stated that the report indicated that ~ax DeFlorin
had tcld the officer tak1ng the reoort that he nad his wife
had been travelin~ cross country together on this trip.
'Thev had stopped at the 'lolidav Restaurant in Provo for dinner
and returned to their motel at the Ramada Inn at apcroximatelv
la,oo P.M.
He stated t1at the report said th•t at that time the
tractor-trailer was still there. He stated that he estimated
the time o: the theft was bet,•een lLOO and 12,0o ->'clock on
7-1-77 as it accarentl9 occurred about the time it started
raining on that night.·
He stated that there had been an insurance claim
filed and apcarentlv it had heen naid.
He stated that onlv the tractor was taken. The
trailer was left. ~'hen your affiant talked to Ron Lvle, L'1le
said that there was a trailer attached to the tractor at the
time of the theft but the trailer was left and only the tractor
was taken.
Lt. ~illman advised your affiant of the
information which was on the stolen reoort.

follo~ing

He stated that it was a stolen lq75 Xenworth Conventional tractor. It had new oaint on the cab which was white
over yellow. !le stated that there was a black emble"1 on
the door which indicated that the truck belon~ed to Faber-,e
Inc. Rayette Division, St. ~aul, ~innesota.
He stated that thev had first received t'ie V!~ i!lJ338ll ,
but it had been corrected Sy ::he driver to V!N iil41758S and
'
that that number was currentl•r entered on t?i.e stolen renort

out of N.C.I.C.

.

The engi:1e in t.'1e truck was a 425 Catenillar enF.ine: !'.e
stated t."'3t the re~rt indicated t.'iat it had all new C'-eneral tires and
all al\JTlirn.:rn -t&eels. ~e renort stated t..~t ':here was no C.B. in t.1.e
tr.JC.1< and t.'iat it had license elate PR 20325 in ~!i."lr\esota.

On 11)-26-7~ your affiant sooke with James Ouar;1 •..r1i~t7\
also an investiP,ator for the Sale Lake Cou;tt;: A:tor:iey s ()~ ic ·
He stated that he had just interviewed one ot t:i~ onwers o.
AB~ b;1 the name ot Riley Good:el~ow. ~r. Good:ellc;w s~~~e~or

that he received a money order in t~e mail 10-25-79 tor :~) -

t~e contin·..led !'ental of Units 76 and :i85 in Building 3 o: ~:-.:,_e
A B C comolex.
~e stated t'.'.i.at t!le envelooe ·vas ':he sar.i.e. as , __ ..
B'.\OD!SCO one sho'W'Tl to him which ~v·as .1 CO!')y of the one t3..<t:n .-::
Leste!' l:laloh ?.of'!":.ero on 9-25-i8.
He sta::ed t:"iat 1:ie a"io1..i.ed. ~'.",.~
~oney to !:nit sk75 and ~L-85 rental in :1:ie na:"'.'le of Art '.·."all
:
~ad no k~o~ledge of ~hat ~as in ':he unit a~d d~d not know ~~:
i;all. :~e size of t:O.e t~.;o ~or.ne-:~ed ·.mits ·.vhich a!"e ac:•.Ja ... ~~ :<
o~eLaw
unit
is 12
x 12 for
x 50.
~fr r.vod:e:.:ow
stated
that
"Jn"..':s
the S.J. Quinney
Library.
Funding
digitization
provided by the
Institute
of Museum
and Lib
35 are sti~~ controlled ~y ~~e ~erson rent~n~ as Art ·~all
1
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iii

WHER£lURF.. tht aHiant prny" th.al" Sean·h WarranL is issued Cur the seizure of 11id itfms (in the
daytime) -~~~iQH. ~nJ that Lh1 ume be brou1ht beCore this m11istr1t1.
xnm>OOMtl(JlE(ltll:<klC(lt'4lll'J'.'ll'llli"!Jtl<Xil!!(:l!J!!'.IJl~~~~lt
X400tl!XQiO:X~iootl~~
~~K;;.i!KY~;iCOOC~cra~i\ICD.ilK~Y::UlalJ'jjJli:~U

:<.,;~;~~l!.~iA~~"""*mi\j(

;<;<~~;xxv~:<~:riX,'~'Pi~1~l'ifl1'~(q,.",;~;~.v;M<.~~.;(.:'.~'9.i>\r.~J;;g~'g'(e",;f,~

~;:Jx~~jWl~~jlj(liaWXY.XtJDOC·:X:ottXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX°'OOOO(

1#""'

Subscribed and sworn lo b.erore me Lhis

JUDGE

In t h • - - - - - - - - ·
Court of -------~
~·County,

StaLe ol Utah
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